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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 11, 2015 Jessica Starr was convicted at a jury trial for possession of marijuana 
and possession of drug paraphernalia. Prior to the trial, the court had granted defendant's motion 
to suppress in-part and denied the motion to suppress in-part. It granted suppression based on an 
illegal search of Starr's room, and suppressed everything found during the illegal search. 
At trial, the prosecution presented audio from the night of the search, including portions 
of Officer Hammer questioning Starr in her room immediately after the illegal search occurred. 
Starr objected to these portions of the audio because it was intertwined with the illegal search of 
her room. The magistrate court ultimately allowed the admissions into evidence. 
Because of the court's ruling on the admissions, the defendant sought to introduce the 
entirety of the audio recording to give the jury a full understanding of the context of Starr's 
admissions. Although the court acknowledged that the audio might show the admissions were 
not reliable because of the pressure on Starr, the court felt that it would be unfair to the state to 
allow the entire audio into evidence. Instead, the court allowed the officer to be recalled and 
questioned about that night. 
Starr timely appealed asserting that(!) the magistrate court erred by allow Starr's 
confession into evidence without addressing whether the taint of the illegal search had been 
attenuated, and (2) the magistrate court erred in prohibiting Starr from introducing the entire 
audio into evidence to show the circumstances of her admissions. 
The district court found that the statements were made in close proximity to the search, 
but affirmed the magistrate regarding the admissions after a partial consideration of the relevant 
legal factors. The district court also affirmed the magistrate in preventing the defendant from 
introducing the remaining portions of the audio. 
ISSUES 
3. Did the district court err in affirming the magistrate, when the magistrate did 
not perform the required analysis of attenuation before admitting statements 
made by Starr as she sat on her bed during an unconstitutional search of her 
room? 
4. Did the district court err in affirming the magistrate, when the magistrate 
deprived Starr of the opportunity to present to the jury the unplayed portions 
of Hammer's audio? 
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ARGUMENT 
1. The district court erred in affinning the magistrate, because the magistrate did not 
perform the required analysis of attenuation before admitting statements made by 
Starr during the unconstitutional search. 
The foundation law on suppression issues is largely uncontested in this case. For 
example, the exclusionary rule deters law enforcement officials by disallowing the use of 
evidence gained through the unconstitutional conduct. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 
805 (1984). "The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way 
is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be 
used at all." Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). The 
exclusionary rule plainly applies to evidence obtained as a direct result of an unconstitutional 
search or seizure. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,484 (1963). However, exclusion 
does not stop with the direct fruit, it "extends as well to the indirect as the direct products" of the 
unconstitutional conduct. Id. 
The question is whether "the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come 
at by exploitation of the illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged 
of the primary taint." Wong Sun at 488. 
To start the process, a defendant need only put forward a factual nexus sufficient to show 
that the "challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal governmental activity." 
Segura, 468 U.S. at 815 ( citing United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 4 71 (1980)). 1 Once a 
factual nexus is alleged, the state bears the burden of establishing that the taint has attenuated, or 
1 lt should be noted that the "but for" analysis was put forward in a five/four decision, which ultimately was decided 
on the narrower grounds of independent source, and the purported test-which has been reiterated again and again 
by Idaho courts-was only dicta expressing the majorities opinion of analysis in Crews, which can also be 
characterized as an independent source case. 
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that there is an independent source of the evidence----other than exploitation of the alleged tainted 
evidence. State v. Kape/le, 158 ldaho 121 (Ct.App. 2014). 
As the Supreme Court in Crews notes the typical case starts with the premise that the 
challenged evidence is tainted. 
In the typical "fruit of the poisonous tree" case, however, the challenged 
evidence was acquired by the police after some initial Fourth Amendment 
violation, and the question before the court is whether the chain of causation 
proceeding from the unlawful conduct has become so attenuated or has been 
interrupted by some intervening circumstances so as to remove the "taint" 
imposed upon that evidence by the original illegality. Thus, most cases begin with 
the premise that the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal 
governmental activity. 
Crews, 445 U.S. at 471. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has affirmed this position and clarified prior Idaho case law: 
"By expressing the query as a "but for" test, we do not imply that a defendant bears the burden to 
prove the negative----that the state would not or could not have discovered the evidence on any 
set of hypothetical circumstances that could have arisen absent the illegal search." State v. 
Kape/le, 158 Idaho 121 (Ct.App. 2014). Instead, a defendant need only establish the factual 
nexus between the illegal act and the objected to evidence. Id. 
In this case, the state conceded that some of the evidence was properly suppressed. Trial 
Tr. p. 3411. 9-11. The state did not argue any of the factors of attenuation: (I) The temporal 
proximity of the illegality and the acquisition of the evidence; (2) whether there are intervening 
circumstances between the illegality and the acquisition of the evidence; and (3) the purpose and 
flagrancy of the official misconduct. As such, the magistrate did not consider the three factors, 
nor did it rule based on those factors. 
On appeal, the district court chose not to address all the factors either. The district court 
found that although the magistrate did not conduct a full attenuation analysis, the magistrate was 
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not required to do so because the magistrate "properly concluded that the temporal proximity test 
was not satisfied." R. pp. 200-01. Rather, than remand for consideration of the proper legal 
standard, and fact finding, the district court chose to attempt to remedy the flaw itself. In so 
doing the district court abused its discretion. 
First the district court considered only a single factor of the attenuation analysis as a 
"test", without considering the other two. R. at 201. This approach is flawed because the district 
court is considering only part of an analysis without considering other factors-i.e. it replaces a 
totality approach with an analysis that places certain factors as a gateway to other factors. 
Additionally, the finding made by the district court that the statements were not temporally 
proximate to the illegal search is not supported by substantial and competent evidence, and are 
internally incoherent with a finding that it was proximate. 
The state's audio, which was played at the suppression hearing and which the parties 
were discussing at trial, firmly refutes any position that the statements were not temporally 
proximate to the illegal search. The district court "agree[d] that the statements were made in 
close proximity to the illegal search." R. at 200-0 I. But the court found that the "temporal 
proximity test was not satisfied. Therefore, there was no need to address the remaining factors." 
R. at 201. The internal incoherence of this rational makes the district court's holding 
unsustainable for an abuse of discretion, because it lacks reason. 
The admission should not have been admitted into evidence without some showing or 
argument about how the taint of the unconstitutional conduct had been dispelled. Miranda 
warnings alone are not sufficient. It was inappropriate for the appellate court to attempt an after 
the fact legal analysis and findings of fact, when such a burden is squarely on the trial court's 
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shoulders and the district court indicated that the trial court did not perform such analysis or fact 
finding. As such, the district court erred. 
2. The district court erred in affirming the magistrate because the magistrate 
deprived Starr of the opportunity to present to the jury the unplayed portions of 
the officer's audio. 
The Idaho Rules of Evidence establish the general rule that: "All relevant evidence is 
admissible." I.R.E. 402. In the present case, magistrate failed to establish a basis for varying 
from this general rule. The state has reframed the issue on appeal as whether the defendant has 
failed to establish abuse of discretion for the evidentiary ruling. However, the magistrate did not 
perform a legal analysis for admission of evidence that fits within the contours of the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence. The magistrate based its rulings on a desire to be fair to both sides, rather 
than on the express language of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. Failure to act within the specified 
guidelines amounts to an abuse of discretion. 
Although the state attempted to save the ruling by arguing that it was based on Rule 403, 
the trial court made no finding that the unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative 
value-which would be required for an exercise of Rule 403. 
The magistrate had already found that the officer had to "wheedle" Starr to get into her 
room. Motion to Suppress Tr. p. 62 I. 11. The defendant sought to undermining the credibility of 
the admission by making the jury aware that the of the "wheedling" that the magistrate found at 
the motion to suppress. Motion to Suppress Tr. p. 63 I. 4. 
The admissibility of these statements is illustrated in Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 
(1986). In Crane the Kentucky court erred by having the jury address the voluntariness of 
confessions, however, it is the case's discussion regarding evidence of the circumstances ofa 
confession that are helpful in deciding the issue at hand. 
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The United States Supreme Court noted in Crane v. Kentucky, "In laying down these 
rules the Court has never questioned that evidence surrounding the making of a confession bears 
on its credibility as well as its voluntariness." 476 U.S. 683,688 (1986) (citation omitted). 
[T]he physical and psychological environment that yielded the confession can 
also be of substantial relevance to the ultimate factual issue of the defendant's 
guilt or innocence. Confessions, even those that have been found to be voluntary, 
are not conclusive of guilt. And, as with any other part of the prosecutor's case, a 
confession may be shown to be 'insufficiently corroborated or 
otherwise ... unworthy of belief.' 
Id at 689 (citation omitted). Ultimately, it is the jury that is "at liberty to disregard confessions 
that are insufficiently corroborated or otherwise deemed unworthy of belief." Lego v. Twomey, 
404 U.S. at 486. This is true even if the court has deemed the statement voluntary, or if the 
defendant has chosen not to seek suppression, but to argue credibility to the jury. Ultimately, the 
Kentucky erred in giving the jury the opportunity to determine whether the statement was 
voluntary, not by allowing the jury to determine the credibility of the admissions. 
Although the state posits that "nothing in the law prevents" the state from objecting to 
the use of suppressed evidence, there has been no authority for the objection cited. Indeed, unless 
a basis for such an objection, the general rule that evidence is admissible should have governed 
the trial court's ruling. The trial court failed to allow the admission of evidence without giving a 
cogent legal basis for the exclusion of the evidence, as such it failed to act within the outer 
bounds of its discretion. Thus, the district court erred in upholding the ruling on appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
The magistrate court erred by allowing audio of Starr's admission, over objection, and 
without addressing whether the taint from the illegal search extended to those statements. 
Additionally, the magistrate court erred by failing to establish a basis for keeping out the 
remaining portions of audio, which Starr sought to admit-inter alia-to undermine Starr's 
admissions. 
For the forgoing reasons, Jessica Starr respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
district court's ruling upholding the magistrate, and grant a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of October, 2016. 
~------~-
/ c. Ira Dillman 
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